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ABSTRACT
David Lewis, in "Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision", outlines his views on
seeing. He discusses, by way of several examples, unusual visual conditions and gives
explanations of why one does or does not see in those conditions. However, it is not always
clear exactly how Lewis' views apply to unusual cases. He also admits that he has made
mistakes in applying his criteria to examples, in the Postscript to the original article.
However, I think Lewis' ideas are worthwhile and would like to expound upon them. In what
follows, I hope to provide clearer criteria that are compatible with Lewis' views, and show
how such criteria do or do not apply to unusual circumstances.
The criteria I will use in place of Lewis derive from a branch of signal theory, called
Information Theory. Information Theory is a formal calculus for quantifying and computing
the information content of a source or a signal carrying information about a source. It is an
attempt to formalize an intuitive notion of information that we all work with. The goal will be
to look for discrepancies between the information theoretic criteria and Lewis' conclusions, so
cases where there is substantial agreement between Lewis and the information theoretic
criteria will be only briefly glossed. Clarification of both views can be obtained by seeing
how and why they differ and which view is plausibly correct about the case.
Thesis Supervisor: Alex Byrne
Title: Associate Professor of Philosophy
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David Lewis, in "Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision", outlines his views on
seeing. He discusses, by way of several examples, unusual visual conditions and gives
explanations of why one does or does not see in those conditions. However, it is not always
clear exactly how Lewis' views apply to unusual cases. He also admits that he has made
mistakes in applying his criteria to examples, in the Postscript to the original article.
However, I think Lewis' ideas are worthwhile and would like to expound upon them. In what
follows, I hope to provide clearer criteria that are compatible with Lewis' views, and show
how such criteria do or do not apply to unusual circumstances.
The criteria I will use in place of Lewis derive from a branch of signal theory, called
Information Theory. Information Theory is a formal calculus for quantifying and computing
the information content of a source or a signal carrying information about a source. It is an
attempt to formalize an intuitive notion of information that we all work with. Even Lewis
mentions information in outlining his view. For, he describes a visual experience as
"matching the scene before the eyes" when the experience has correct information content
about the scene before the eyes. An experience matches the scene before the eyes only insofar
as the information content of the experience is (mostly) correct with regards to the scene
before the eyes . Lewis relies heavily on this notion of the scene before the eyes producing
matching visual experiences, so an exploration of what exactly this means is worthwhile.
I propose to approach the topic in the following way. Section II will briefly sketch
Lewis' views on seeing. In Section III, I will supply a brief technical introduction to
Information Theory and outline information theoretic criteria that can be applied to the same
kind of problem that Lewis is considering. Section IV will run through the cases presented by
1 Lewis, David: Philosophical Papers, v. 2, p 274 All future page references are from the same text unless
otherwise noted.
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Lewis, in the order he presents them. For these cases, I will discuss how Lewis responds to
the case, and how the information theoretic criteria might decide the case. The goal here will
be to look for discrepancies between the information theoretic criteria and Lewis' conclusions,
so cases where there is substantial agreement between Lewis and the information theoretic
criteria will be only briefly glossed. Clarification of both views can be obtained by seeing
how and why they differ and which view is plausibly correct about the case. Finally, in
Section V, I will turn to a case that Lewis recognizes, but does not really address. I will
examine the paradox of seeing that it is too dark to see, and explain how this seemingly
paradoxical statement can be disambiguated to resolve the paradox.
II
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II. The Counterfactual Dependence Theory of Seeing
Lewis starts off by making quite clear what notion he intends to analyze. The word
'seeing' has several important and subtle variations in meaning, which can be confused quite
easily. The notion of 'seeing' Lewis means to be discussing is the grammatically intransitive
sense of the verb 'to see'. We are not here concerned with whether such-and-such a thing in
the scene before they eyes is seen or not. Lewis is only considering whether or not one sees,
and not what in particular one sees while they are seeing2. Also, the notion of 'seeing' Lewis
is interested in precludes the possibility of seeing what is not a scene before the eyes. One
may see, in some sense of the word, that which is not there. Hallucinatory daggers and other
such false visual experiences are sometimes described at seeing. However, this is not the
sense of 'seeing' Lewis is discussing. For Lewis' purposes, if one "sees that which is not
there", then one is not seeing. In other words, if one is genuinely seeing, then the content of
their visual experience is correct.
3
Lewis builds his view progressively, considering some criteria and then applying them
to examples to see if they hold up or not. I shall not discuss the examples in detail here, but
will go through the steps that Lewis does in reaching his view. A first, intuitive criteria would
be that one sees just in case the scene before the eyes causes a matching visual experience.4
Lewis remarks that this is good enough for most normal cases, but may break down when
considering some more unusual scenarios. The example of a veridical hallucination comes up
as a counter -example to this case. One may be hallucinating, the hallucination might well be
caused by something in the scene before the eyes (i.e. the Wizard or Brain before the Eyes
cases), and the visual experience matches the scene before the eyes when interpreted in the
normal way. If something in the scene before the eyes causes one to hallucinate, and the
2 However, when we turn to Section V, seeing such-and-such a thing or seeing that so-and-so is the casewill be
important, since both these senses of "seeing" entail the sense we address here.
3 Or, at least mostly correct. Some amount of error in visual experience must be tolerable even in genuine cases
of seeing.
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hallucinatory experience matches the scene, then this criteria is satisfied. The scene before
the eyes causes a matching visual experience, namely the hallucinatory experience.
Intuitively, the person is not seeing in such cases. In these examples, the individual is
hallucinating. When someone is hallucinating, that person does not see in the sense Lewis has
in mind. Unfortunately, there is nothing about the concept of a hallucination that precludes
the possibility of the hallucinatory experiences matching the actual scene before the eyes5 . A
hallucinatory visual experience might very well match the scene before the eyes, even though
it is hallucinatory. Distinguishing genuine seeing from veridical hallucination caused by the
scene before the eyes drives most of the discussion that follows.
A first attempt at ruling out veridical hallucination is to require that the visual
experience be caused "in the normal way". In the examples of veridical hallucination, the
visual experience is not caused by light reflected in to the eye of the individual, but by some
other means. Indeed, calling the experience 'hallucinatorV suggests that it is not caused by
normal visual processing, but by some other means (drugs, blows to the head, psychiatric or
neurological disorders, etc...) This, as Lewis points out, rules out too much. For one thing, it
rules out the possibility of artificial eyes or other means of vision replacement. It also means
that creatures that do not see in the same way that we do (the "normal" way), in fact do not
see at all. Again, this is intuitively wrong. One would hope that medical science will some
day be able to restore sight to the blind by means of prosthetic eyes or other means that do not
involve the same kind of processes that go on in normal sighted humans. One would also
hope that extraterrestrial creatures are in principle capable of sight, even if the mechanisms by
which their visual experiences arise are different from those in human beings.
4 p2 7 3
5 If you find the notion of an experience "matching the scene before the eyes" to be problematic, the problem of
veridical hallucination can be re-cast in terms that do not rely on matching the scene before the eyes. If the
hallucinatory experience matches the experience you would have had, were your experiences formed in the way
they normally are, the same problem arises. There should be no difficulty in the notion of ones actual experience
matching a counterfactual experience.
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Another attempt to rule out veridical hallucination is based on the fact that any
matches between the scene before the eyes and the hallucinatory experience would be rare.
One would not expect hallucinatory experiences to match the scene before the eyes very often.
Few, if any, of the hallucinatory experiences would match the scene before the eyes. Again,
this will not do. In principle, one could have a very long running series of veridical
hallucinations. Even though longer series of veridical hallucinations are considerably more
improbable than shorter series, the probability never reaches zero. So it could happen that
someone had a very long run (maybe even a life-long run) of veridical hallucinations. It still
seems that one is not seeing if one's experiences are hallucinatory. Also, as Lewis points out
in the Deathbed Cure example, one may be granted sight for a very brief period of time. The
fact that the period of sight is very short, and so produces only a few matching visual
experiences, does not seem to detract from it being a genuine case of seeing. There is no
reason to think that creatures with a life span of a few seconds can not see, for no other reason
than the fact they live such a short time and so would have very few visual experiences.
Lewis then moves to his proposal for ruling out veridical hallucinations. This is the
counterfactual dependence criteria of seeing. Not only muit the scene before the eyes cause a
matching visual experience, it must also be the case that were the scene before the eyes to be
suitably different, the visual experience would be different in similar ways . It is not at all
clear that in cases of veridical hallucination, a counterfactual situation in which the scene
before the eyes was different would result in a different visual experience. Indeed, changes to
aspects of the scene which have no causal role in producing the experience should have no
impact whatsoever on the visual experience produced. This is most or all of the scene in cases
6 Intuitions on this may vary. It may be incorrect to describe someone who has a life-long run of veridical
visual 'hallucinations' as not seeing. They may simply be seeing in some non -standard way. (i.e. The Minority
case).
7 Lewis does not address the question of what constitutes a "suitable difference" is, claiming that this is an
empirical matter. Lewis claims the only thing his analysis provides is the assertion that there must be many
"suitably different" scenes available to discriminate. Once we have the theoretical machinery from Section III, I
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of veridical hallucination. The match in cases of veridical hallucination is accidental. The
scene might have been quite different without affecting the experience in any way. This also
allows us to properly explain the cases ruled out by the other two attempts. Artificial eyes or
momentary restorations of vision count as cases of seeing, since in those cases a
counterfactual scene would have resulted in different visual experiences.
However, Lewis is not quite done yet. Not just any old counterfactual dependence
between the visual experience and the scene before the eyes will do. For one thing, the
dependence must not be a backtracking dependence from the experience to the scene. In other
words, the scene must be the cause of the experience, rather than the experience the cause of
the scene. This is needed to handle The Screen case that Lewis discusses. We shall look at
the example in question later on. Briefly, if some situation were to arise in which an
individual's visual experiences were causally responsible for matching changes in the scene
before the eyes, it seems unusual to describe this as a case of seeing. Seeing is generally
passive with respect to the scene before the eyes; visual experiences resulting from seeing
what is before you are caused by the scene, rather than causing that scene to come into
existence.
Furthermore, Lewis suggests that there must be a "large class of alternative possible
scenes (that might have been) before the subject's eyes". 8 This large class must be divided
into many mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses, such that any two scenes in a
sub-class produces identical visual experiences which closely matchthe scenes, and scenes
from different subclasses produce different visual experiences. 9 Ideally, there would be
precisely one scene per subclass, but this is too much to ask for. The subclasses, however,
should be considerably smaller than the overall class. Thus, the requirement that there be
think we can do away with terms like 'many' or'suitably different' alternatives and other terms which are not well
defined.
8 p283
9 p2 8 3
__ I_
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many subclasses. In order to ensure the subclasses are small, and yet cover the large space of
possible scenes, there have to be many of them. The questions that immediately arise are (a)
how large must the class of alternate scenes before the eyes be, (b) how many subclasses must
there be, and (c) how small do the subclasses have to be? 10 Again, Lewis defers on questions
regarding these criteria. He simply stipulates that the criteria are vague, and that there are
bound to be borderline cases.
This seems to be Lewis' final suggestion for criteria on whether or not one sees. One
sees just in case the scene before the eyes is the cause of a matching visual experience, where
a visual experience matches a scene just in case the information content of the experience with
respect to the scene is largely correct, and the visual experience is appropriately
counterfactually dependent (no backtracking) on the scene before the eyes, such that were the





III. Information Theory and Seeing
A. Preliminaries
I now turn to a discussion of Information Theory. Information Theory is one branch
of a larger engineering discipline known as signal theory. It was compiled into current form
by a Bell Telephone company engineer I, for use in evaluating equipment needs for telephone
systems. It is a theory that is used to describe various aspects of information flow, including
how much information is generated by an event (also referred to as a source), how much
information is transmitted to another location about an event, and how much information a
particular transmission system is capable of sending. This theory has exensive practical use
in the engineering of transmission systems, which need not concern us here. Rather, for our
purposes, we will focus on what information is and how to quantify how much information
there is.
Information theory typically assumes the following kind of set-up: There is some type
of event about which we want to know things. There are two or more distinct possible
12
outcomes for this event 2. Upon completion of the event, one possibility is realized. Of
course, after an event realizes one of two or more possible outcomes, the unrealized outcomes
are no longer possible. After outcome A is in fact the outcome that occurs, it is no longer
possible that outcome B or C will in fact be the outcome that occurs. The removal of these
other outcomes from the set of possible outcomes is what we shall call 'information'.
A situation in which one or more formerly possible outcomes are removed from the set of
possible outcomes is a situation in which information is generated 3. Such an event is referred
11 c.f. Shannons The Mathematical Theory of Communication
12 The possible outcomes I will discuss with respect to seeing are in general the same as the alternate scenes
Lewis refers to. I will not consider whether or not there are possible outcomes which are, physically or logically,
impossible included in the set. For now, assume all possible outcomes or alternate scenes are physically
possible.
13 Technically, this is not quite right. Information is generated when the probability distribution among the
possible outcomes shifts further from a flat distribution(each possible outcome is equiprobable), and thus closer
to a boundary distribution (single outcome with a probability of I, all others probability of 0). Thus an event in
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to as a source of information. The realized outcome is the source state.
Just as information can be generated, it can be transmitted from one location to
another. A transmission system, for information theoretic purposes, is the following:
Suppose we Inve some apparatus - a device with some manner of detector at one end and an
indicator at the other end. A detector is something which is sensitive to the outcomes of some
type of event. A detector takes on different states, depending on the state of the event it is a
detector of. A particular detector state occurs just in case the outcome of the detected event is
one particular outcome among the possible outcomes of the event. The responses of the
detector travel (by wires, radio waves, or what have you) to the indicator, causing the
indicator to realize different states based on the responses of the detector. The indicator
realizes some particular state if and only if the detector responds in a particular way, and the
detector in turn responds in that way if and only if the particular type of event the detector
responds to realizes a particular outcome. Such an apparatus is referred to as a transmission
system The state of the indicator (called the 'output state') indicates the state of another evert
(the source). The output state may be very far removed in space-time from the source about
which it carries information. This is usually the case in the more useful transmission systems
we have, such as telephones, television, and photographs of long ago events. It need not
always be so, such as with microscopes or medical imaging devices. Human visual
perception falls in to this latter category, as we shall see later on.
One thing to notice is that transmission systems also fit the definition of a source; they
are events that realize one of two or more possible outcomes. The crucial difference between
a source and a transmission system is that an ideal transmission system generates zero
additional information. Any information content present in the states of the indicator is
information about the source, not about the apparatus or the indicator itself. In the ideal case,
progress may generate some information, even before the final outcome is realized. In any event, this is accurate
enough for the purposes of this paper.
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given the source is in a particular state, the output state of the transmission system could not
have been anything other than what it actually is. If there are no other possible states the
transmission system could be in, the transmission system generates no information. There
must be two or more possible outcomes for an event realizing one outcome to generate
information. This is not the case in an ideal transmission system. 14
At least two questions arise: (a) How much information does a source generate, and
(b) how much of that information is available in the output state of some transmission system?
There are other questions we might have as well. How much information can a system
transmit 15? Is it even possible for the system to transmit all the information generated by
some source? How good is our transmitter? Does the transmission system really generate
zero information? If not, how much of the information in the output state is generated by the
transmission system, and how much by the source? All of these questions, in one way or
another, rely on comparing "how much" information content there is. Some system is needed
to allow us to compare information quantities. Information Theory is an apparatus for
providing a quantitative answer to these questions. We will see shortly that the quantity of
information is proportional to the number of possible outcomes of an event. Since this can be
an extremely large number for some kinds of events, Information Theory represents quantities
of information as a logarithmic value of the number of possible outcomes. For base 2
logarithms, the unit of information quantity is called a "bit".
I now turn to formulas for calculating how many bits of information are generated by
an event, or transmitted by a transmission system. Readers who do not want to read through
the formal calculus may skip ahead to Part D of this section, without severely impacting their
14 Unfortunately for us, actual transmission systems typically do generate some amount of excess information.
When the output state of a transmission system carries both information about the source and information
generated by the transmission system, we have a so-called noisy signal. 'Noise' is the term used to refer to any
information content of an output state that is not generated by the source. 'Signal' is used to refer to the
information which is generated by the source. The Signal to Noise ratio, or S/N ratio, indicates how good a
transmission system is. Systems with a higher S/N ratio are better transmission systems. An ideal transmission
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comprehension of the rest of the material. I include the calculus for completeness sake, since
I will be discussing quantity of information at points later in the paper. However, no
calculations or attempts to quantify the quantity of information in actual scenes before the
eyes is attempted.
B. Discrete Case formulas
Consider the following as a starting point. The quantity of information generated by
an event where one of a discrete number of possible and equally likely outcomes occur is N
bits, where N is equal to the base 2 logarithm of the number of possible outcomes before the
actual outcome of the event occurs 16. This is written in mathematical notation as:
[1] N=log2(X)
where X is the number of possible outcomes. So, flipping a fair coin generates one bit of
information, since there were two possible outcomes of this event that might be actual before
the coin landed. N=log2(2)=l1 bit. Three fair coin flips in a row, taken as a single event
where each sequence of heads and tails is considered different 17, generates 3 bits of
information (8 possibilities: N=log2(8)=3 bits). Rolling a fair 6-sided die generates 2.585 bits
of information (6 possibilities: N=1og2(6)=2.585 bits). Drawing one card from a fairly
shuffled deck of 52 distinct cards generates 5.7 bits of information (52 possibilities:
N=log2(52)=5.7 bits), and so on.
Of course, this formula for information quantity has very restricted uses. It is only
system has a S/N ratio of infinity.
15 The amount of information a system can transmit is called the 'bandwidth' of the transmission system.
16 Unless mentioned, all of these formulas apply to calculating the amount of information transmitted by some
transmission system as well. For a transmission system, replace "generated" with "transmited", "event" with
"system" and "outcomes" with "output states" to describe a transmission system, rather than an event about
which information is to be gathered.
17 In other words, the sequence 'Heads, Tails, Heads' is different than the sequence 'Heads, Heads, Tails'. If
particular sequences are not considered different, such as if any sequence containing 2 heads and 1 tail were
counted as the same, then this composite event would generate less than 3 bits of information. We shall see how
to calculate how much information is generated by that case shortly.
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applicable when the following three conditions apply:
[a] there are a finite number of possible outcomes
[b] each of those outcomes is equally likely to occur
[c] one particular outcome is clearly indicated as the result
We require a more general formula for the computation of the information generated by a
particular kind of event or transmitted by a system. I shall address how to eliminate each of
these three conditions, but not in the above order. Let us first address the question of non-
eqiprobable outcomes (condition [b]). Notice that Formula 1 [N=log2(X)] can be transformed
by law of logarithms into this equivalent formula:
[la] N= -1 * log2(1/X)
where X is the number of possible outcomes before the event completed. Also notice that, in
the case where each outcome is equally likely, (1/X) is equal to the grobability of a particular
outcome occurring. Using probabilities, however, presents a problem. If the outcomes are
notequally probable, then what probability value ought to be used in the formula? If we use
the probability for outcome A, does this sayanything about the information generated when
the outcome of the event is B? In the case where the outcomes have different probabilities,
the information generated by an event varies, depending on the probability of the resulting
outcome. So, the formula for the information generated by a particular outcome of an event is
[I b] Nx = -1 * log2 (P(X))
when P(x) is a function from outcomes of an event to the probability of the specified outcome.
In the discrete case, this function is called a probability distribution function, henceforth
abbreviated as 'p.d.f, for the event. X is a particular outcome, which is usually a number
representing the position of the outcome in a list.
Now we know how to calculate the information generated by a particular outcome of
an event. But what we want to know is how to calculate the average amount of information
generated by an event, regardless of how it turns out. To do this, we weight the information
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generated for each possible outcome by multiplying the quantity of information produced for
each possible outcome by the probability of that outcome Then we add all the weighted
information values up. In formal notation, when there are a discrete number of possible
outcomes [a] and one outcome is clearly the result [c]:
M
[2] N = P(X)*Nx
X=1
where P(x) is a probability distribution function, and Nx is Formula [lb]. Substituting [lb]
for Nx yields:
M
[2a] N = P(X)* -1 * log2(P(X))
X=I M
Sigma is the standard mathematical symbol for summation. The notation 'F(X) is read as
X=1
'The summation from X equals 1 to M of F(X).' It is shorthand notation for the sum
F(1)+F(2)+F(3)+....+F(M) [i.e. the value of the function F(X) at every integer from 1 to M
inclusive]. The numbers 1,2,3,...,M indicate the positions of possible outcomes for the event
on an enumerated list. The same formula can be used for a countable infinity of possible
outcomes (M=oo), although the calculus of infinite summations will need to be deployed in
evaluating such sums.
Let us now turn to removing condition [c]. Since we are talking about information
loss, this restrictions only applicable when discussing the amount of information transmitted
by some system. 18 Suppose that there is an event which has X possible outcomes. We have a
transmission system that sends information about the outcome of the event to another
location. However, the output states of our information-carrying system eliminate only some
possibilities for the outcome. One case where this happens is when the number of output
181 assume that when an event ends, the result is one particular outcome, and all others are no longer possible. If
this is not true for some events, then what follows may apply to such sources. It may also apply to events with
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states is less than the number of source states. For example, suppose we have some system
that turns a light bulb on or off depending on the outcome of a dice roll. A dice roll has six
possible outcomes, while the light bulb system only has two possible output states (on or off).
Such a system cannot unambiguously indicate which of the six possible source states was
realized. There must be at least six distinct output states to do this 9.
Suppose that, in the above system, the light turns on if the outcome is 1, 2 or 3. It
remains off if the outcome is 4, 5 or 6. Of course, after the state of the light bulb is set (the
output state), it will not be the case that one of the possibilities now has a probability of 1.
However, in order to remain probability values, it must still be the case that the sum of the
p.d.f. over all outcomes is 1; it will simply be that some of the 'outcomes' (i.e. the ruled out
ones) now have a probability of 0, and sono longer help to satisfy the requirement that the
p.d.f. sum up to 1. The probability of some or all the remaining outcomes must increase to
ensure the p.d.f. satisfies this requirement. This means that, after our output state occurs, we
have a new probability distribution among the remaining possibilities (the ones with a non-
zero probability), which must still add up to 1. With this new p.d.f., we can calculate how
much information we would gain, were we to have an additional output state that ruled out all
but one of the remaining possibilities, in exactly the same way we did before. Since the
output states in our above example do not carry this extra information, this value represents
how much information about the source is missing from the output state of the transmission
system. In other words, when there are a discrete number of possible outcomes [a],
M L
[3] N = -1 * P(X) * log2(P(X))] - -I * Q(Y) * log2(Q(Y))
X=1 Y=I
Where 1,2,..,L represent positions on a numbered list of the remaining possibilities after
intermediate stages, where some but not all of the final outcomes are eliminated at some intermediate step.
19 Again, this is not quite right. It is true only when there is no redundancy in the source states. We need not
consider this problem for the purposes at hand
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output state occurs, and Q(Y) is the p.d.f. over those remaining possibilities.
C. Continuous Case formulas
Now, we turn to the remaining condition [a]; infinite possible outcomes. I mentioned,
in discussing how to eliminate condition [b], that we could handle a countable infinity of
possible outcomes using the calculus of infinite sums. All that remains to completely
eliminate condition [a] is to deal with non-countable infinite sets of possible outcomes.
Things are more complex when there is a non-countable infinity of possible outcomes,
however. Unlike the discrete case, where the probability of a particular outcome was the
value of the p.d.f. at that outcome, the p.d.f. and the probability measure function (the
function that, given a range of outcomes, yields the probability of the outcome lying in the
supplied range) yield different values when applied to single outcomes in the continuous case.
By definition, the probability of one particular outcome, or any finite or countably infinite set
of possible outcomes, occurring frcm a non-countable infinity of possible outcomes is zero.
This is easy enough to see. In the discrete case, probability theory requires the p.d.f. to sum
M
up to 1 (i.e. XP(X) = 1), and the probability of the actual outcome being one member of
X=1
some set of outcomes (even if the set includes only one outcome) is the sum of the p.d.f.
values at those outcomes 2 . A similar restriction applies to continuous probability
distributions. The difference is that, for a continuum of possible outcromes, the definite
integral of the p.d.f. over the set of all possible outcomes must equal 1, and the probability of
any subset of outcomes is the definite integral of the p.d.f. over those outcomes. Since the
definite integral of a function at points is always zero, the probability value assigned to any
countable subset of a non-countable set of outcomes must also be zero. We can only
meaningfully calculate the probability of the outcome lying within a range. However, the
20 Throughout this paper, I am assuming that the probabilities are independent. Thus, the probability of a
source realizing either outcome X, Y or Z [P(X or Y or Z)] is equal to P(X)+P(Y)+P(Z).
_ ~ _1_1__1__
Tnmmer 19
p.d.f. value of a particular outcome is not zero at every point. Indeed, it cannot be zero at
every point, since it must integrate to 1 over the range of outcomes. Thus, the value of a
continuous p.d.f. at a particular outcome is not generally the probability value of that
outcome.
So, by parity of construction (replacing summations in Formula 3 with integrals), we
get the following as the corresponding formula for the quantity of information content in a
continuous case:
CB CD
[4] N= -1 * P(X)*log2(P(X)) dX - I -1 * Q(Y)*log2(Q(Y)) dY
JA JC
A and B replace 1 and M respectively, in the first half of formula [3]. C and D replace 1 and
L respectively, in the second half of [3]. There is one very important difference between this
and the discrete case, however. Unlike the discrete case, where the second summation drops
out (has value zero) when there is one particular outcome which is clearly the final outcome,
we cannot drop the second integral in the formula and say that the average information
generated by a source, or transmitted by a system that indicates one definite outcome of an
event with a non-denumerable infinite set of outcomes is
CB
[4a] N= I -1 * P(X)*log2(P(X)) dX
JA
The problem with [4a] is that we can not assign to one particular outcome of an event,
with a non-countable infinity of possible outcomes, a probability of one without violating the
restriction on p.d.f.'s that they must equal one when integrated over the whole domain of
possible outcomes. To demonstrate this, I offer a reductio argument. Suppose there were a
p.d.f. for the case of one particular outcome of a non-countable infinity of possibilities being
actual. If one particular outcome of the non-countable infinity is certainly the outcome
_ 1_1
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(probability 1) and all other possible outcomes are certainly not the outcome (probability 0),
then the definite integral of the resulting p.d.f. over any range of outcomes containing that
particular outcome must have value 1, and the definite integral of that p.d.f. over any range of
outcomes not containing that particular outcome must have value 0. In particular, when
integrated over the range containing only that one particular outcome with a probability of 1,
the definite integral must equal 1. However, any definite integral over a single point has a
value of zero (c.f. previous paragraph). This contradicts the assertion that the definite integral
over any range containing the particular definite outcome has a value of one. A similar
reductio can be constructed for reducing the possible outcomes from a non-countable infinity
to any finite number, or even a countable infinity, of remaining possible outcomes. Thus, we
cannot simply drop the second integral, without getting a meaningless result. Removing the
second integral assumes that the p.d.f. is a function which has the above mentioned
contradictory properties. We can only calculate the information quantity of a state that
reduces the final outcome to a member of some non-finite subset of the original possible
outcomes. 21
I will now show that, from the general formulations in [3] and [4], the more specific
formulations follow as special cases. Take Formula [1], applicable to cases where there is a
finite number M of possible outcomes, each outcomes is equally likely and all but one
possible outcome has probability zero after the event occurs. We can derive our initial
formula for this veryspecialized case from the general discrete formula:
M L
N= [ -I * P(X) * log2(P(X)) - -l * Q(Y) * log2(Q(Y)) {Formula [3]}
X=1 Y=1
21 Intuitively, to learn that one particular outcome from a non-countable infinity of outcomes is actual would
require a non-countable infinite amount of information. We almost certainly never have that much information
available about anything, so the problem with the mathematics should never cause difficulties in actual cases.
Whether or not this presents problems in principle for information theory is not a topic I will address here.
- -- --- -- 111911L--s
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M 1
= [1-1*1/M*log2(1/M)I - [X -l*l*log2(1)] {substitute constant p.d.f's}
X=1 Y=1
= M*[-I*I/M*log2(1/M)] - [-1*1*0] {replace summations with multipliers}
=- 1 * (M/M) * log2(1/M) - 0 {simplification}
= -1 * log2(1/M) {simplification}
= log2(M) {law of logarithms}
D. Information Theory application
I now turn to the application of Information Theory to the issue of seeing. How can
Information Theory be put to use in providing criteria for whether or not an individual sees?
Let us start with the following details about a typical case of seeing. There is some actual
scene before the eyes. There is also some large number of counterfactual scenes that might
have been before the eyes. Since there are several possible scenes that might have been
before the eyes, only one of which is realized, an actual scene before the eyes generates
information. An actual calculation of the information content of the scene before the eyes
would be difficult to carry out, since one would have to know the p.d.f. for the possible scenes
before the eyes. However, it should be clear that there is a p.d.f. for possible scenes before the
eyes, and that not all possible scenes need be equally likely 22. So, an actual scene before the
eyes, since it rules out alternative possible scenes, is a source of information. There is also a
system (i.e. the human visual system) by which information about the scene is carried by way
of my visual experiences. The properly functioning visual system is a transmission system,
with detectors that respond to the scene before the eyes, and indicators in the form of visual
I
22 For example, scenes which include a live Bengal tiger sitting on my office desk are less likely than scenes
which include a pile of papers sitting on my office desk. I will not explore the details here, but there is some
correlation between the probability of a possible scene being actual and the remoteness of counterfactual worlds
from the actual world. Possibilities realized in more remote counterfactual worlds (such as the world in which
there are live Bengal tigers roaming about Cambridge, MA and wandering in to offices) are less probable than
those realized in worlds nearer to the actual world (where there are no live Bengal tigers roaming about
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experiences
This transmission of information from the scene to the content of the visual experience
seems to be the crucial element for a criteria of seeing. One sees just in case their visual
experiences are the output states of an information-transmitting system whose source is the
scene before the eyes. Again, an ideal visual system is one which generates no new
information; all the information present in some visual experience should be information
transmitted from the scene before the eyes. This is almost certainly not the case for actual
human visual systems. But, the question of how good an actual visual system is need not
concern us here. I will assume an ideal visual system (which adds no new information) in the
discussion to follow.
We can answer the question of whether or not an individual sees by answering the
question of whether or not the individual's visual experiences are output states of a
transmission system, which has the scene before the individual's eyes as the source. In
addition, our answers to the above question can be finer grained than merely a 'yes' or 'no'
answer. We can, in principle if not in practice, describe how well someone sees. You and I
may both be seeing, and yet you see much better than I do. Both our visual experiences are
output states, carrying information about the scene before our respective eyes, but your visual
experiences carry more information than mine do. It is unclear to me that Lewis appreciates
this about the grammatically intransitive sense of 'seeing' he is concerned with, and I believe
this leads him to make some mistakes in applying his criteria to the cases he brings up.
Some additional notes before I move on to the examples that Lewis presents. We
should be clear that the objective is to provide a definition of seeing, such that we can decide
whether or not a particular individual sees. This definition will almost certainly differ from
conventional use of the grammatically intransitive sense of seeing. In general, for it to be
Cambridge, MA)
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conversationally appropriate to say that someone sees, the individuals visual experiences must
do more than just carry some amount of information about the scene before their eyes. The
experiences must carry 'enough' information, in some poorly defined sense of 'enough'.
Consider the example of an individual who is so near sighted that he cannot discern
anything about the scene before his eyes further away than the tip of his nose 23. For objects
less than a nose length away from his eyes however, he can see well enough to read and forge
signatures on documents. The correct general usage of the word 'seeing' would probably be to
say this person cannot see. Yet, if he can duplicate signatures well enough to be an
accomplished forger, how can he do this without seeing? If pressed, I think most people
would agree that he does see, but sees extremely poorly. So poorly that in typical
conversation, we ought to just say he cannot see. The sense of seeing we are interested in is
the former one - the one that people will typically acknowledge when pressed with examples
like these.
Another advantage over Lewis is the lack of dependence on an undefined 'large'
number of alternate scenes or 'many' subclasses. While the requirement of a large number of
alternate scenes may work for most cases, it raises problems in the case of impoverished
visual environments. If there are not a 'large' number of alternate scenes, it seems Lewis
would have to describe the individual as not seeing. It seems odd that a sighted person could
be rendered blind, simply by reducing the number of alternate scenes that might be before
24their eyes . Information Theory only requires there to be two scenes in the class of
alternates, one of which is the actual scene before the eyes. In such situations, the person may
still be seeing, although they see very poorly. Their poor sight is merely a result of the fact
that there is little to see. But, having very little to see should not be enough to render one
sightless. Only the case where there is quite literally nothing to see, can one be rendered
23 The example I have in mind is a character from the 1963 Steve McQueen movieThe Great Escape.
24 The exception, of course, is when the number of possible scenes is reduced to one.
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sightless by changing the environment. It may not be possible for there to be a situation in
which there is nothing to see (no alternate scenes to the actual one), so perhaps not much turns
on this. In any event, I find the number 'two' to be a much easier number to comprehend than
the number 'large'.
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IV. Lewis versus Information Theory: The Examples
A. Preliminaries
The title of this section is misleading. I do not mean to suggest that Lewis and
Information theory are in opposition; indeed, I find there is a great deal of overlap between the
two. However, I think a few points are clearer in Lewis' way of describing whether one sees
or not, while many other points are clearer with an information theoretic criteria of seeing.
My intention here is to compare the two criteria, clarifying points and pointing out possibly
misleading cases. Lewis himself, in the Postscript to "Veridical Hallucination...", suggests he
has misapplied his own criteria to scmane of the cases in the original paper. I wish to run
through the cases presented by Lewis in that paper now, considering what Lewis says about
them and comparing it to what an information theory account might say. Some disagreements
will arise, and I will look at these as they come up in the discussion.
The first two cases do not require much examination. They are clearly cases in which
the subject does not see. Neither of these examples is a situation in which the scene currently
before the eyes is a cause of the visual experience the subject has, and so are not cases of
seeing by Lewis' criteria. In the first case (The Brain), the visual experiences is not of
something in the scene before the eyes. The second example (Memory), although the visual
experiences are experiences of scenes before the eyes, they are not caused by the current
scene before the eyes.
This is an important distinction to make. Visual experiences produced in the Brain or
Memory cases may very well be output states of a transmission system, from an information
theoretic view. The problem is not that the experiences are not output states of an information
transmission system (although they may not be), but that the source of the information is not
the scene before the eyes at all, or a former scene before the eyes, in these cases. One sees
just in case their visual experiences are output states of a transmission system with the scene
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currently (when the experience happens) before the eyes as the source 5. Lewis also restricts
seeing to the current scene before the eyes. In both cases, any information content of the
experience is not transmitted from the current scene before the eyes, because the processes
that produce the experience operate independently of the current scene before the eyes. Thus,
they are not cases of seeing.
B. Veridical Hallucinations
The next three examples are more difficult for Lewis, since in all three cases,
something in the scene before the eyes does cause the visual experience. Two of these
examples (Brain Before the Eyes and The Wizard) are what Lewis calls "veridical
hallucinations": Hallucinatory experiences that happen to match the actual scene before the
eyes. Furthermore, since something in the scene before the eyes is the cause of the experience
in all three cases, Lewis must add his counterfactual analysis to adequately explain these
examples. None of these three cases is a case of seeing, according to Lewis, because they are
not cases in which the causal connection between scene and experience has the right
counterfactual structure. Counterfactual scenes would not have produced correspondingly
different experiences.
Similar results are obtained with an Information Theoretic account of seeing. Not just
any causal connection between a source and an output state is enough to make a transmission
system. It is built in to the concept of a transmission system that there be the kind of
counterfactual dependence that Lewis requires for cases of seeing. The Brain Before the Eyes
is not a case of seeing because, although the cause of the experience is the scene before the
eyes, the process by which the scene before the eyes causes the experience is not a
25 We shall see shortly that things other than human eyeballs may count as 'the eyes' for purposes of
determining the scene before the eyes. Watching a live TV broadcast probably should count as a case of seeing,
where the scene before the 'eyes' is the scene before the TV camera lens.. Watching a videotape will not count as
a case of seeing, for much the same reasons as Memory is not a case of seeing.
ITnmmer 27
transmission system. It is not clear at all that the output states of this process are sensitive to
the scene before the eyes in the way that a transmission system must be. Indeed, it is not clear
that any change in the scene before the eyes would result in a different experience. If so, then
there are no alternate output states possible and so no information carried by the output state.
Similarly for the Wizard. The process by which the wizard causes the visual experience is not
a process which transmits information about the scene before the eyes, since the process is not
sensitive to the scene before the eyes. Suppose the wizard were casting his spell from behind
the subject, or off to the side of the subject, or in front of a completely different field of
background objects. There is no reason to think the visual experience would be any different,
and so no reason to believe the subject's visual experience carries any information about the
current scene before the eyes.
The light meter example is slightly more difficult. In this case, the visual experience
of the grassy field is caused by the scene before the 'eyes', which in this case is the light meter
responding to the scene. The process does appear to be one which transmits information
about the scene. The light meter system is sensitive to the light levels of the scene before it,
producing different output states when there are different light levels in the scene. I think
perhaps Lewis dismisses this example a bit too quickly. It does seem to share many features
of a genuine case of seeing. In particular, it could be viewed as a kind of prosthetic eye, and
Lewis does think that one can see with a prosthetic eye. Lewis' restrictions on the
counterfactual dependence, regarding the size of the class of alternative scenes and the
number of subclasses that produce different visual experiences is deployed to handle this case,
ruling it as a case of not seeing.
I find the Information Theory explanation to be better. I believe the correct answer to
the Light Meter case is that it is a case of seeing, albeit extremely poor seeing. So poor that,
for most purposes, it would be appropriate to say that a person who has visual experiences
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produced in this way is not seeing. Again I think this may be appropriate for typical
conversation, but technically wrong. A person with such a visual apparatus does see, if only a
little, about what is before their eyes.
Perhaps the temptation to classify this case as a case of not seeing is that the light
meter only transmits information about the brightness of the scene before the eyes. It is
insensitive to the color or shape of objects contained in the scene, since the light meter
detector is not sensitive to those aspects of the scene. Thus, the experiences produced in the
Light Meter case do not carry information about those aspects of the scene. The image of the
grassy field, when interpreted 'in the normal way', would lead to a misrepresentation of the
scene before the eyes most of the time.
However, Light Meter visual experience is sensitive to some aspects of the scene (the
brightness). Because of this, the light meter should be viewed as a type of poor prosthetic eye
which allows one to see just a little bit about the scene before the light meter. We might vary
example, say using a dense grid of tiny light meters that each affected a small part of the
overall visual experience. It is more tempting to say that the subject does see in these cases,
because more information about the scene is transmitted with the proposed modifications.
Again, I think this is just a linguistic convention. It should not be mistaken with a criteria for
seeing. A dense grid of tiny light meters allows one to see more - to see better - than one can
see with the single light meter. The difference seems to be only a matter of degree. Both light
meter cases are cases of seeing, or neither is. Furthermore, arguing that neither is a case of
seeing seems to rule out too much as seeing, including normal human vision26
C. Prosthetic Vision and Broken Prosthetic Eyes
26 The human eye is not much more than a dense mass of light meters, with a lens to allow foctsing. Some
receptors respond to specific frequency ranges in the 400nm to 700nm wavelengths, while others respond to all
the radiation in these wavelengths. The difference between human vision and the light meter seems to be just a
matter of degree as well.
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The next two examples (The Minority and The Prosthetic Eye) are, as Lewis argues,
genuine cases of seeing. They are, however, cases which do not involve the same kinds of
causal mechanisms that go on in normal sighted human beings. Lewis argues that both these
examples are cases of genuine seeing, by pointing out that they are processes by which the
visual experience is causally connected to the scene before the eyes, and the connection has
the right kind of counterfactual dependency. Information Theory, too, would include these as
cases of seeing. So long as the causal process in question is a transmission system, whose
detector is sensitive to the scene before it, both examples meet the Information Theory criteria
for seeing. No big mysteries here.
The next example (The Deathbed Cure) is problematic, and the example after that
(The Loose Wire) presents a great deal of difficulty. I group these two examples together
because The Deathbed Cure is the extreme case of The Loose Wire example, where the wire
contacts only once. I will focus my remarks on the Loose Wire example. In this case, the
subject has a prosthetic eye, which is functionally equivalent to a genuine human eye .
However, there is a loose wire in the prosthetic eye. When this wire comes off the correct
contact point, the eye malfunctions, producing visual experiences consisting of random
splotches of color. When the wire touches, however, the eye functions as it is supposed to.
Lewis suggests that "Whether [the subject] sees has nothing to do with whether the wire
touches the contact often, or seldom, or only this once."' 28 He takes this to be a case where the
subject does see, at least when the wire makes contact.
However, it is not obvious at all from Lewis' remarks why he should say this. In fact,
applying the counterfactual dependence criteria he outlines, one might conclude that he should
say that the subject does not see if the wire contacts rarely or only once. For, it seems
7 For our purposes, take 'functionally equivalent' to mean that if your genuine eyes were replaced with the




plausible that probability comes in to the picture for this example. Rather than a strict
dependence or indbpendence of the experience on the scene before the eyes, it appears as
though there is a probability of the experience being counterfactually dependent on the scene.
And, this probability is influenced by whether the wire touches frequently, or seldom, cr only
this once. If the wire touches most of the time, then there is a high probability that the
experience is counterfactually dependent on the scene. If the wire touches seldom, there is a
low probability of that dependence holding. It is plausible to say that one sees only so long as
29there is a high enough probability of the counterfactual dependence holding 29
Lewis discusses this in the Postscript to the article. He essentially argues the
following. At any particular instant, the dependence either holds or does not hold.
Probability only arises when considering the dependence through time. It is not the case that,
at a particular instant in time, the counterfactual conditional is probabilistic. Only when
considering spans of time can the probability in question be appealed to. He suggests that,
since the dependence either holds or does not hold at any particular instant, the subject either
sees or does not see at that instant. Sometimes they do see, and sometimes they do not see.
However, they do see at any instant where the counterfactual dependence holds. The fact that,
over a span of time, the subject does not see at some instants in the span, has no bearing on
whether the subject sees or does not see at other instants in the span of time.
An information theoretic explanation of the example yields the same results as Lewis.
Whether one sees or not is independent of how often the loose wire makes contact. It is only
dependent on whether the wire actually does make contact or not at some instant in a span of
time. The subject sees when the wire makes contact, and does not see when the wire comes
loose. The temptation to classify this as a case in which one does not see when the wire rarely
contacts has to do, not with whether or not information is transmitted from the scene to the
29 It seems unlikely that there is a 100% chance of the correct dependency holding even in the case of normal
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experience, but whether or not one may rely on their visual experience as a source of
information about the scene before the eyes. All that is necessary for a system to transmit
information at some instant is that, at that instant, the output states of the device are sensitive
to the states of the source which it transmits information about. So long as at that instant of
time, if the source were in a different state, the output state at that same instant would have
been different, the system transmits information about the source. When the prosthetic eye is
functioning as designed, it is sensitive to the scene in this way30 . When the wire contacts, the
system transmits information about the scene before the eye. When the wire comes loose, we
are dealing with a different system. That system (the eye with the loose wire) has different
functional properties from the other system (the eye with the wire in place). The former
system is incapable of transmitting information about the scene before it, the latter system is
perfectly capable of transmitting that information.
It is, however, a further question to ask which system is currently in place. If the
broken contact wire is the current system, then one ought not to use visual experience as a
source of information about the scene. If the good contact wire is the current system, then one
ought to rely on their visual experiences as a source of information. However, without the
additional information as to which of these systems is in place at any given instant, it can be
difficult to decide whether to rely on one's experiences or not. When we lack this information
about a particular instant, the probabilities come in to play. If the wire contacts frequently,
then one can reasonably rely on their visual experiences as a source of information about the
scene before the prosthetic eyes. If the wire contacts rarely, then one should not rely on those
experiences as a source of information about the scene. And, of course, there are cases where
it is unclear whether one can or cannot reasonably rely on their visual experiences for
human vision. Unless something below certainty of the dependence holding through time is acceptable, it may
turn out that even normal human beings do not see! This would be an unacceptable result.3ONotice that a broken eye is different from an eye which, when functioning normally, fails to produce output
states that carry information about the source. We shall look at bad prosthetic eyes later on, and why they may
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information about the scene before the prosthetic eyes. The question of whether one ought to
rely on their experiences as a source of information about the scene before the eyes is,
however, distinct from the question of whether the visual experiences are a source of
information about the scene before the eyes. And, as mentioned earlier, they are if the good
wire contact system produces them, and they are not if the broken wire contact system
produces them.
D. Alternative Scenes and Discriminable Scenes
The next two examples (Laser Beam and Hypnotic Suggestion) are intended to show
that the counterfactual dependence that Lewis proposes need not be complete. Not every
possible alternate scene, regardless of how subtle or drastic the change, need produce a
correspondingly different visual experience, or any visual experience at all. Ideally, this
would be the case. However, one can see even if not every feature of the scene, or every
possible alternate scene, before the eyes is accessible by way of visual experience. There can
be invisible differences between scenes, such as in the Hypnotic Suggestion. There can be
differences under which the visual system cannot function properly, as in the Laser Beam
example. The number of subclasses within the class of alternative scenes needs to be 'many',
but need not be a 1-to- 1 correspondence of alternative scenes with visual experiences, nor
need it exhaust the space of possible scenes before the eyes.
An information theoretic analysis provides similar answers to these examples. Even
though there are possible circumstances under which the transmission system cannot operate,
information transmission is possible so long as the actual circumstances are not one of these.
Furthermore, the possibility of differences that the transmission system output states cannot
discriminate between has no impact on whether or not information about the scene is
fail to be systems by which one can see.
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transmitted by the system in other circumstances, unless no possible alternate scene would
produce a different output state. All Information Theory can be used to show is that the less
discriminating a system is, and the fewer scenes it responds to, the less information it
transmits. Still, a system may transmit some information about some source states, even if it
is incapable of transmitting all the available information about any source state.
The fact that, for example, a volt meter cannot measure an electric potential of 115,200
volts, without being destroyed, does not mean it cannot transmit information about voltage.
The fact that a volt meter with a sensitivity of 0.01 volts cannot discriminate between a 2.0001
and 2.0002 volt current has no impact on whether it carries information about voltage or not.
The volt meter cannot measure, or discriminate between, those particular voltages. It still
transmits information about voltage as long as the voltages fall within the range of voltages
the detector can respond to. It can discriminate between voltages that produce different output
states. Of course, the more voltages within the measurable range, and the more output states
for differentiating voltages, the better the volt meter (the more voltage information it
transmits). These considerations only affect how much information the volt meter carries, and
not whether it carries voltage information or not (unless how much information is carried
turns out to be zero information).
A transmission system need not be perfect to be useful enough to gather information.
Likewise, a visual system need not transmit all the information in the scene before the eyes to
be a system that allows one to see. Visual systems, like volt meters, can be better or worse. A
volt meter may be extremely bad, capable of measuring only whether there is 0 volts or not.
But a bad volt meter is still a volt meter, and a bad visual system is still as visual system.
E. Backtracking Dependence
The next example exposes a weakness in Infirmation Theory. I believe Lewis has the
_ ___ ~~_~_____ __~~
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correct analysis of The Screen example, although Information Theory as I understand it would
disagree. In this example, the normal causal connection between the scene before the eyes
and the visual experience is reversed. Instead of the scene causing one to have visual
experiences, the visual experiences one has (pseudorandomly in this example) cause the scene
before the eyes to change in corresponding ways. A very fast computer monitors your brain
state while you hallucinate. Based on the measurements it takes, the computer predicts what
your next visual experience will be and projects an image on a screen before the eyes that
matches that experience. Lewis argues that this is not a case of seeing, for although the
counterfactual dependence between the scene and the visual experience is of the right kind, it
nevertheless "goes the wrong way" to count as an instance of seeing. This is what Lewis calls
a "backtracking" counterfactual dependence. The scene is counterfactually dependent on the
visual experience. So, the experience is counterfactually dependent on the scene by
"backtracking" this counterfactual dependence. He suggests this is not an appropriate way of
establishing a counterfactual dependence between scene and experience for seeing to occur.
Unfortunately, Information Theory cannot say the same kind of thing in response to
this example. The distinction between a source and an output state in a transmission system is
essentially arbitrary. If the output states contain information about the source, then the source
states contains information about the output as well. The source is sensitive to the output state
in the right way for a functional transmission system. Any change in the output state would
accompany a corresponding change in the source. Even worse, transmission systems need not
even follow causal connections. In one instance of this, a transmission system may exist
where the source is one of two or more effects of some phenomenon, and the output state is
another of these effects. One example is the connection between a barometer reading and rain
tomorrow. Neither barometer reading or rain tomorrow is a cause of the other; both are
effects of low atmospheric pressure. Yet, barometers are often used to supply information
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about tomorrows weather.
As another example, there is a transmission system that exists between the television
set in my house, and a television set tuned to the same station in your house. Any changes in
the source (your television) results in corresponding changes in the output state (my
television), even though your television is in no way causally connected to my television.
Furthermore, one can not appeal to interference or a malfunction in one of the sets to show
that no such information channel exists. For, such a change alters the transmission system in
question. A different system may transmit completely different information, or none at all.
However, this particular system does transmit information, even without a causal connection.
My intuition on how to handle these problems is unclear, however. The latter case -
where transmission systems do not follow causal connections - seems to have import for a
case that Lewis rules out in his analysis. The possibility of seeing some scene other than the
one before the eyes appears to be related to this. Lewis' intuitions are that this is not a case of
seeing, although even he admits that these cases are not clear one way or the other 31. He
ignores them in pursuing his analysis of seeing.
Backing up a bit, the case where the visual experience is the cause, rather than the
effect, of the scene before the eyes is unclear to me as well. Some science-fiction scenario
similar to The Screen could be imagined, where one's visual experience brought about
corresponding changes in a physical world that the subject had to navigate, etc... Such an
individual would have useful information about their environment, based on their visual
experiences. Even though their experiences caused said environment to be the way it actually
is, there is sufficient information transmission to make the information content of that
person's visual experience usable in the same way that a truly sighted person would make use
of them 32. For now, I will simply stipulate that the "right kind" of transmission system must
31 p2 7 6
32 I assume that the subject whose visual experience changes the world has no conscious control over what their
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be in place for seeing to occur, where the "right kind" of transmission system is a system
where the source is a causal ancestor of the output state. This is an unsatisfactory way of
resolving the difficulty, but exploring the problem here would take us too far afield.
F. Bad Prosthetic Eyes versus Broken Prosthetic Eyes and The Censor
We come to the final example presented by Lewis in the paper. This is the most
difficult example to explain, and so Lewis saves it for last. This is the case of The Censor. In
the case of The Censor, the censor wishes to ensure that the subject has only a limited range of
visual experiences (in this case, only one experience). He has the capability of interfering
with the subjects visual system, causing the subject to have whatever visual experience the
censor desires them to have. However, he intervenes only when the scene before the eyes
would produce an unacceptable visual experience. When the actua I scene before the eyes will
produce an experience the censor permits, he does not interfere with the operation of the
subjects visual system. In such cases, the subject's visual experience arises from the same
kind of process that produces visual experience in normal sighted humans. As soon as the
scene changes to something other than one which will produce an acceptable visual
experience, the Censor intervenes to ensure the subject has such an acceptable experience.
The question here is: Does the subject see while the Censor is not intervening (when the scene
before the eyes is the cause of the visual experience)?
Lewis' answer to the question is no, but it is not immediately evident that he should
respond this way. This example shares features in common with two previous examples. It is
similar to The Loose Wire case, save for the fact that in the Loose Wire case, the intervention
is essentially random. In the Censor case, intervention into the visual process is dependent on
the scene before the eyes, and so may be different enough to warrant a different response. It
visual experiences are, just like normal sighted humans
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also bears a striking similarity to the Hypnotic Suggestion case. Even Lewis points out that
this is "Example 11 [the Hypnotic Suggestion] carried to extremes". 33 The difference seems
to lie only in the frequency of intervention; the Censor intervenes more often than the
Hypnotic Suggestion does to ensure only acceptable visual experiences are produced.
Unfortunately, we already discussed the issue of frequency of intervention in the Deathbed
Cure and Loose Wire examples. There, we came to the conclusion that frequency of
intervention (how often does the process work to produce visual experience with the correct
counterfactual dependence on the scene) was irrelevant to whether or not the subject sees.
Can the fact that the intervention in Censor-type cases is not random, but dependent on the
scene before the eyes, make such a difference to the analysis?
I believe the answer is that it does make the difference. To see why, I again turn to
Information Theory for an explanation. In the Loose Wire case, I argued that we were dealing
with two distinct systems. One system was the prosthetic eye with the wire making good
contact, the other was a prosthetic eye with the wire not making good contact. With the good
contact system, the subject sees; with the bad contact system, the subject does not see.
Whether or not the subject sees depends only on which system is currently producing the
visual experiences; it does not depend on the frequency with which one system or the other is
currently operating. The reason these are two separate systems is that the switch between
good contact and bad contact is essentially random. It has no dependence on the scene before
the eyes.
However, when the switch from one system to the other is dependent on the scene, the
switch is part of the function of a single, larger system that incorporates these processes as
subsystems. The composite system composed of a Censor, his intervention system and a




more like the case of a bad prosthetic eye - a system which fails to transmit information about
the source as part of it's normal functioning. In the Censor example, it is part of the function
of the system that alternate visual experiences are produced when the scene before the eyes
would not produce acceptable experiences by the other means (the means like those in normal
sighted humans). In the extreme case, where only one specific visual experience is allowed
by the Censor, the visual experiences of the individual affected carry no information about the
scene. Since there is only one possible visual experience, the system cannot carry any
information at all. There have to be at least two possible output states - visual experiences in
this case - for the system to even be capable of transmitting information about a source.
However, I would describe a Censor case where there are two permissible visual
experiences as a case of seeing, if only very little. With two permitted visual experiences, the
system conveys some information about the scene before the eyes - at least the information
that a scene which produces the other permitted visual experience is not before the eyes. This
is not very much information at all, but it is more than no information. We should, in typical
conversations about seeing, probably say that a person who only has two distinct visual
experiences cannot see. But, as I have said before, I think this is technically incorrect. The
person who only has two possible visual experiences does see, so long as those experiences
are the output states of a system that transmits information about the scene before the eyes.
They just see extremely poorly.
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V. The Paradox of Seeing that One Cannot See
I wish to consider one additional example, briefly mentioned by Lewis but not pursued
in any detail. It is not one of the numbered examples that appear in the article, but presents an
opportunity to clarify the notion of seeing that is being used throughout this paper. The
example I have in mind is the case of total darkness. Lewis mentions this near the beginning
of Section VIII. 34 He suggests that, on his analysis, that we do not see in total darkness. Yet,
he finds this to be paradoxical. After all, we do see that it is totally dark when in such
situations. If true that we see that it is too dark to see, then it seems to follow that we see in
the grammatically intransitive sense Lewis describes. "How else - by smell?" 35 It also can not
be the case that we see that it is dark by the very fact that we do not see, for we also do not see
in thick fog or dazzling bright light. These failures to see are qualitatively different than when
we do not see in total darkness. Yet, if we see this, that contradicts the very proposition seen
to be the case! It seems that we must see that we cannot see, but seeing that we cannot see is a
flat-out contradiction. Lewis simply points out the problem, suggests there is an ambiguity in
the word 'seeing', and moves on without further consideration. I wish to offer an explanation
of what is going on when we 'see' that we can not see. More precisely, I shall try to offer a
disambiguation of seeing, such that the first occurrence of 'see' in the paradoxical statement is
not the sense of 'seeing' used throughout this paper and Lewis' paper.
Transmission systems, even ones designed to transmit information about certain kinds
of sources, may be used to transmit other kinds of information. They may even be used self-
diagnostically, to provide information about their own workings. This self-measuring ability
of transmission systems is what goes on when one calibrates a system. For example, a scale is
typically calibrated by placing an object with known mass on the scale. The indicator




way, the scale delivers not information about the mass of the object (we know that already),
but about it's own operation. We test the accuracy of the scale, and make adjustments to
improve that accuracy when needed. The scale, which normally delivers information about
the mass of other objects, is used to transmit information about itself in these circumstances.
Another situation in which a device's output states carry information about itself,
rather than about an external source, is when an error indicator is present. This may be an
explicit indicator, such as a light marked "Error" or a digital display of the letters "ERR". An
error state may also be implicit in the normal indicator of values, such as when a scale or
meter is pegged3 6. When the needle or pointer pegs, the position of the needle or pointer does
not indicate anything meaningful about the source it usually transmits information about. It
merely indicates that something is not correct with the system itself. Frequently, this occurs
when the value for the property being measured exceeds the range in which the device can
operate. If you place a 5 1/3 pound weight on a postal scale intended to measures weights up
to 1 pound, the pointer will peg. Of course, other things can cause pegging as well. The
spring may be broken or badly deformed, so that even a ½ pound object pegs the scale. It
may be improperly calibrated. Pegging a scale is often caused by exceeding the range of the
scale, but not always. All a pegged scale indicates is that something has gone wrong with the
device.
Furthermore, this kind of failure is distinguishable from other kinds of failures. The
object may be too light to be measured by the scale. The mechanism may be jammed,
preventing the needle from moving. The fact that the needle does not move off zero, even
when an object is resting on the scale, also indicates that something has gone wrong.
Furthermore, this failure is distinguishable from a failure in which the scale pegs. Something
35 p283
36 'Pegging' a meter occurs when the needle or pointer on the display quickly moves to the top or bottom of the
range of values, usually slamming in to a small peg designed to stop the needle from moving further. This
usually results in a clicking noise as the needle hits the peg.
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has gone wrong, and something different from what goes wrong when the scale pegs has
happened. Both indicate that something is wrong, but they indicate that different sorts of
things have gone wrong. In either case, what is indicated is information about the apparatus
used to transmit the weight information, not information about the weight of the object on the
scale. Something is not right with the scale. One may infer from this that the object is too
light or too heavy to be measured by the scale, since this is the explanation of the failure with
the highest probability. However, this is inferred from the information presented. It is not the
information presented by the scale's output state.
My explanation of what is going on when one 'sees that it is too dark to see' should be
evident by now. When it is too dark to see, the visual system cannot transmit any information
about the scene before the eyes. It may still transmit information, but this information is
about the visual system itself and not the scene before the eyes. One can infer from the visual
experience of total darkness that there is insufficient light in the scene before the eyes to allow
proper visual functioning. This is, however, not what the visual information content is. What
the experience of total darkness indicates is that something has gone wrong with the visual
system. Furthermore, it indicates a particular way things have gone wrong. What has gone
wrong is different from the kinds of things that go wrong when surrounded by thick fog or
confronted with dazzling bright lights. In any event, these experiences provide information,
not about the scene before the eyes, but about the visual system itself. One infers from this,
based on previous occurrences, that it is too dark, or too bright, or too foggy to see, depending
on the kind of experience. One infers from the fact that, in the past, failures of this particular
kind were corrected by flipping on a light switch, lighting a candle, etc..., that this particular
failure of the visual system is more than likely caused by a lack of light in the scene before the
eyes. But the inference is based on information about the visual system.
Since the information present in such error experiences is not information about the
_ _I~ i _
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scene before the eyes, but about the visual system itself, these experiences do not count as
cases of seeing in the sense used throughout this paper, and by Lewis. They are visual
experiences, and they are visual experiences that provide us with information. However,
since seeing (in the sense we are interested in) only occurs when the source of information in
visual experience is the scene currently before the eyes, experiences that provide no
information about the scene before the eyes do not count as experiences by which one sees.
One infers that it is too dark to see based on one's visual experiences, but does not 'see' in the
sense that we are interested in. The sense of the word 'see' used first in the phrase 'seeing that
one cannot see' implies a sense of grammatically intransitive seeing in which one's visual
experience carries some information, regardless of the source. This is a perfectly fine sense of
the word 'see'; it just is not the sense which interests us here. Furthermore, it is different than
the sense used in the second occurrence of the word 'see' in that phrase. Thus the phrase
appears paradoxical.
I think a similar explamtion is open to Lewis, although he does not avail himself of
them. When it is too dark, the scene before the eyes does not cause visual experiences. Light
is required to cause responses in the visual system. Unless the absence of causes is itself a
came, the scene with no light cannot cause the visual system to respond. Since the scene
before the eyes must cause the visual experience, with the right sort of counterfactual
dependence, total darkness is not a case in which one sees. The experience is caused by the
internal workings of the visual system, not the scene before the eyes. It therefore does not
count as a genuine case of seeing, even though it may be useful for learning things about the
scene before the eyes
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VI. Conclusions
Lewis was on the right track in "Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision".
Many of the ideas he puts forward fit nicely with an information theoretic account of what it
means to see. However, I think Lewis made at least two mistakes. One was his refusal to
explore some of the restrictions on seeing, such as the requirement that there be 'many'
alternate scenes or that there must be 'suitably different' changes in the scene before the eyes,
and so on. I suspect this is what led him to the second mistake; deciding that cases of
extremely poor sight (The Light Meter) are cases of not seeing. This may accord with more
common usage of the word in conversation, but I suspect that when pushed, we can see that
this is technically correct. After all, if the person with the light meter can differentiate
between bright and dim scenes based on his visual experiences, how else can he do this
without seeing? By smell?
In spite of this, there is quite a bit of agreement between Lewis and the Information
Theory account I haw described. Indeed, Lewis' account of the Screen example still strikes
me as the correct account. Information Theory alone is not adequate to explain why The
Screen case is not a case of seeing, and merely stipulating that seeing requires a transmission
system where the source is a causal ancestor of the output state is unsatisfactory at best.
Unfortunately, I have no better suggestion for how to handle this kind of a case.
However, I do think Lewis rules out too much as genuine cases of seeing. His lack of
a fine-grained account of this grammatically intransitive sense of 'seeing' requires him to give
a yes or no answer to the question. This I think leads him to rule cases of seeing very badly as
cases of non-seeing, such as the Light Meter example. I see no substantial difference between
the Light Meter and normal human vision, save for a difference of degree. The individual
who has only two possible visual experiences cannot see very much, but not seeing much is
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